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Presented below are excerpts from Access to Information material pertaining to the development of CIPO’s examination guidelines for medical diagnostic claims, as establish in Practice Notice PN 2015-02 now incorporated into Section 17.03.04 of CIPO’s Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP).
These excerpts are presented in chronological order, and are only a select sampling of the full documents. Excerpts are linked to the page of the full PDF on which they occur in order to provide context. Page numbers reflect PDF page numbers.
Jump to:
- Excerpts from 2011 ATI documents
- Excerpts from 2012 ATI documents
- Excerpts from 2013 ATI documents
- Excerpts from 2014 ATI documents
- Excerpts from 2015 ATI documents
- Excerpts from 2015 Advice to the Deputy Minister
Dramatis Personæ*
*Positions are contemporaneous with ATI documents and may not be current
**Positions are based on 2016 information and may not be current
Sylvain Laporte – Commissioner of Patents*
Agnès Lajoie – Assistant Commissioner of Patents*
Chris Evans – Chair of the Patent Appeal Board*
Paul Fitzner – Patent Appeal Board Member*
Ed MacLaurin – Patent Appeal Board Member*
Konstantinos Georgaras – Director General, Corporate Strategies and Services*
Marc de Vleeschauwer – Program Manager, Patent Branch Training*
Josée Pharand – Program Manager, Examination Practice*
Michael Gillen – Division Chief, Biotechnology*
Kathleen Murphy – Division Chief, Biotechnology**
J. Scott Vasudev – Division Chief, Patent Policy and International Affairs**
Shirley Arpin – Section Head, General Chemistry and Organic Chemistry Division**
Nicholas Ohan – Section Head, Biotechnology Division*
Isabelle Robert – Section Head, General Chemistry and Organic Chemistry Division*
Robert Rymerson – Section Head, Biotechnology Division*
Sophie Beaudoin – Senior Patent Examiner, General Chemistry and Organic Chemistry**
Katrina Campsall – Senior Patent Examiner**
Yong-Huang Chen – Patent Examiner, Organic Division*
Xiao-Ying Ma – Senior Patent Examiner*
Alessandra Mezzetti – Senior Patent Examiner, General Chemistry and Organic Division*
Maria Mill – Patent Examiner, Biotechnology Division*
Excerpts from 2011 Documents:
“Certains examinateurs et chefs de section semblaient ne pas être d’accord avec les directive et l’interpretation de la décision Amazon.”
From a French language “Rapport de la formation sur les directives suit a la decision Amazon.com” (Report on training on the guidelines following the Amazon.com decision) dated November 2011:
…
…
…
…
…
Excerpts from 2012 Documents:
From a document entitled “Diagnostic Methods as Patentable Subject Matter in Canada” attached to emails dated January 2012:
(page 6)
“My concerns continue to be that these documents are inconsistent, if not with the FCA Amazon decision, then with SCC precedents.”
From an Email from Ed MacLaurin – January 6, 2012 6:31 PM:
(page 71)
“My fear is that by adopting a two step approach… we may be painting a bit sign on our practice that says “appeal”. The FCA has… indicated that they are leery of new, creative approaches to assessing patentable subject matter that are not grounded in Canadian case law.
From an Email from Paul Fitzner – January 9, 2012 11:27 AM:
(page 50)
From an Email of Chris Evans – January 9, 2012 12:17 PM:
(page 50)
“Why is [it] that the Office must have the liberty to create new legal principles? Isn’t that the real issue here?”
From an Email from Ed MacLaurin – January 9, 2012 1:33 PM:
(page 49)
From an email from the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Agnès Lajoie – February 2, 2012 2:34 PM:
(page 187)
“WON’T WE BE ACCUSED AGAIN OF IGNORING THE CLAIMS IF WE MAKE A [SECTION 2] ARGUMENT ON THAT [INVENTIVE CONCEPT]?”
From a document entitled “rough guide to applying purposive construction” dated February 9, 2012:
(page 124)
“What should I do before the meeting tomorrow in order to help the discussion and avoid spending all the time discussion (sic) diagnostic methods…”
From an Email from the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Agnès Lajoie – February 20, 2012 12:04 PM:
(page 185)
“As far as diagnostics… a decision will have to be made… as to whether the practice notice includes this or not and what our position might be.”
From an Email from Katrina Campsall – February 20, 2012 1:44 PM:
(page 185)
From one version of a revised document entitled “Diagnostic Methods as Patentable Subject Matter in Canada” dated February 27, 2012:
(page 25)
From a “Patent Branch Newsletter” dated March 30, 2012 2:14 PM:
(page 98)
“I agree that nothing much as (sic) changed relatively (sic) to the previous practice, although as you pointed out during the meeting, under certain circumstances language choice is very important.”
From an Email from Alessandra Mezzetti to the Assistant Commissioner of Patents – April 20, 2012 9:04 AM:
(page 172)
“As detailed below I have strong concerns regarding these patent notices.”
From an Email from Nicholas Ohan – May 1, 2012 8:13 AM:
(page 90)
From an Email from J. Scott Vasudev – June 19, 2012 excerpted below:
(page 184)
“Now at the 11th hour you are tasking us to do what you have all failed to do?… I have provided [the same] feedback for years apparently to no effect. There is no reason to believe that you would listen now…”
From an Email (in reply to the above) by Nicholas Ohan – June 19, 2012 8:21 AM:
(page 189)
“I thought I might be a lone voice in objection to the contribution analysis as previously formulated and reborn now as the inventive concept analysis. Thankfully, I am not.”
From an Email (also in reply to the above email of June 19, 2012) by Yong-Huang Chen – June 19, 2012 10:19 AM:
(page 189)
Excerpts from 2013 Documents:
“…Sylvain needs to be educated”
The year began with media lines for the release of post-Amazon practice, and with the Canadian College of Medical Geneticists forwarding its statement on gene patents (not included in the ATI material) to then Commissioner of Patents, Sylvain Laporte, and Assistant Commissioner, Agnès Lajoie. Mr. Laporte solicited input on this document from Ms. Lajoie and Patent Appeal Board Chair, Chris Evans:
(page 332)
Mr. Evans’ response of February 13, 2013 mentioned the debate raging over gene patents in the U.S. at the time. Mr. Evans stated that CIPO must weigh in on the patentability of diagnostics pursuant to the Amazon FCA decision (2011 FCA 328):
Mr. Laporte stated that he did not understand the issues:
(page 7)
Ms. Lajoie asked for input from Dr. Michael Gillen, then Division Chief of Biotechnology, noting Mr. Laporte’s indication that he “needs to be educated”:
(page 20)
Mr. Gillen replied on February 18, 2013 with point-form (page 23) and written (page 24) summaries, the latter noting with respect to diagnostics that “A tremendous amount of effort is needed to associate a particular gene with a medical condition”.
“Do we want the CoP to get briefed by the US on how they handle these types of applications and why?”
On March 18, 2013, Katrina Campsall wrote to Scott Vasudev, referring to an upcoming meeting between Mr. Laporte and his USPTO counterpart, and asking if “we want the [Commissioner of Patents] to get briefed by the US on how they handle these types of applications and why”:
(page 36)
On March 26, 2013, Konstantinos Georgaras noted that Mr. Laporte had mentioned that post-Amazon practice would permit the patenting of personalized health diagnostics. Mr. Georgaras asked if this was true:
(page 41)
Mr. Georgaras explained that his question was prompted by significant government investment in the area of personalized health research:
(page 40)
Mr. Evans stated that the subject was contentious, and equated the patenting of a diagnostic to the patenting of mere information:
(page 40)
On June 17, 2013, Mr. Laporte emailed to ask for information pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court decision in Myriad:
(page 59)
“It remains to be seen… whether applications in Canada will reflect the subject-matter restrictions imposed by the US Supreme Court.”
Ms. Campsall’s reply noted that the U.S. Myriad decision “has no legal impact on the patenting of DNA in Canada”, but then stated, “It remains to be seen… whether applications in Canada will reflect the subject-matter restrictions imposed by the US Supreme Court”. An excerpt reads:
…
(page 58)
“The intention is to present some examples to the Commissioner so that he may become better informed on how diagnostic methods may be construed in light of PN2013-02.”
Returning to June 6, 2013, Ms. Campsall reported that she had drafted Example scenarios, each presented with both a “broad and narrow approach to framing the problem and solution”:
(page 48)
The Examples themselves begin on page 49 and are worth reading to understand what was later to be debated. Example 3 (“Old diagnostic marker for new condition”) proved most contentious. To avoid confusion over numbering, it is noted that an analogous scenario was presented as Example 4 (“New meaning attributed to acquired data”) in a later set of discussion material (see August 15, 2013 and page 149).
The broad and narrow approaches were referred to again by Ms. Campsall in an email of June 27, 2013, and the explanation of these two approaches appears in an out-of-order document entitled “Considerations for Diagnostic Methods”, dated June 23, 2013, and bearing the initials “KC”. This document indicates that taking the “broad approach” will result in most diagnostic method claims being statutory. Under “Approaches” is the following:
(page 42)
The alternative “narrow approach” – said to be undertaken “when an examiner seeks a deeper understanding” – leads to a conclusion of non-statutory subject matter when the solution resides in new meaning for data:
(page 42)
The conclusion to this document indicates “Thus, a determination of whether or not a claim is statutory may be influenced by which approach is preferred”:
(page 43)
It is rather untenable that claim interpretation should hinge on an examiner’s desired level of understanding. The requirement for a new step to acquire data sounds very much like impermissible contribution analysis. The implication that common general knowledge is the “converse” of novelty is also incorrect.
Ms. Campsall sent a draft Practice Notice and Examples to Marc de Vleeshauwer on July 16, 2013, in advance of a meeting on diagnostics planned for the following week:
(page 64)
The draft Practice Notice indicated that a claim involving “first use” of a diagnostic tool or “discovery of a new physical means to acquire data” would generally result in a finding of statutory subject matter. On the other hand, when the physical steps were part of the common general knowledge, “the method intrinsically cannot be part of the problem or its solution, and thus, cannot be essential elements of the claim”. An excerpt appears below:
(page 66)
Here, in 2013, much of what underpins PN2015-02, albeit not yet couched in terminology that superficially disguises the persisting contribution approach or the direct involvement of prior art; we find terms such as “first use”, “newly-discovered”, “known”, and “discovery” as considerations in the above.
A revised set of Examples was circulated by Ms. Campsall on July 25, 2013, just in advance of the planned meeting:
(page 76)
On July 29, 2013, it was noted by multiple individuals in attendance that an “impasse” had been reached at the meeting in the diagnostic discussion:
(page 100)
Mr. Evans attempted to clarify matters with a further question involving a new Example in which a marker indicative of one disease is later found to be indicative of another:
Isabelle Robert, noted the conflation of subject matter eligibility and prior art issues in this Example and stated that it did not help matters. Noting the “circular discussion at those meetings now”, she asked for the question of how to proceed to be put directly to the Commissioner:
(page 101)
Ms. Campsall provided an explanation to Mr. Vasudev in an email of July 30, 2013. Noting the impasse, she indicated that consensus had been reached for claims involving an essential physical step, but stated there was a divergence of opinion when the physical data acquisition steps were part of the “common general knowledge”:
(page 103)
Given the later misunderstanding of common general knowledge and the above suggestion that common general knowledge may simply be the converse of what is new, it is unclear exactly how the term “CGK” is being applied here.
“Chris mentioned to me that he is convinced that we don’t need to go to Sylvain for a decision…”
On August 1, 2013, the Assistant Commissioner also suggested bringing two options to the Commissioner for a decision:
(page 103)
Ms. Lajoie reported on August 6, 2013 that Mr. Evans did not believe involvement of the Commissioner was necessary:
(page 110)
This is not the last time that Mr. Evans would advise against taking the matter to the Commissioner.
In the above email, and in one sent by Ms. Campsall on August 5, 2013, we see the first suggestions that “this is a prior art issue, not a subject matter issue”. Ms. Campsall suggested stepping away from the contentious question of statutory subject matter, and instead looking at other issues such as “inherent anticipation”:
(page 108)
This is mirrored in her comments to Mr. Vasudev on August 7, 2013:
(page 110)
“The group discussing diagnostic methods has hit an impasse… Chris, and to some extent Katrina, are on one side of the fence and everyone else is on the other side… It seems that our task here is to keep analyzing diagnostic claims until we find a reason to reject some or all of them… or until those in favour of allowing these claims give up.”
Following this suggestion, Mr. Gillen wrote to a group of Biotechnology Section Heads on August 7, 2013 noting the impasse. He stated that “Chris [Evans], and to some extent Katrina [Campsall], are on one side of the fence and everyone else is on the other side”. Noting the shift away from subject matter eligibility and towards the new issue of inherent anticipation, Mr. Gillen remarked that the exercise appeared to be aimed at invalidating diagnostic claims or at wearing down the resolve of those in opposition to this outcome:
(page 112)
Following this impasse, Isabelle Robert solicited input from her colleagues on August 9, 2013 (page 124), as did Shirley Arpin (page 127), and Mr. Gillen (page 125). Mr. Gillen set out his view that neither inherent anticipation nor subject matter eligibility were concerns for the contentious Examples (see paragraph 9 below):
(page 125)
“From my point of view, I think diagnostic methods are the practical application of the correlation. You need to consider both the data acquisition step and the data analysis/correlation step.”
In one discussion thread, Biotechnology Examiner Maria Mill wrote to express her view:
…
(page 118)
Nicholas Ohan expressed agreement with Ms. Mill’s reasoning, indicating “For me, it all comes down to Shell Oil.” (page 118).
“They are trying to contrive an example in which inherence would be applicable…”
Another commonly expressed view was that the Examples provided for discussion were flawed. Mr. Ohan noted this on August 9, 2013:
(page 128)
“I find the examples narrow and simplistic and not very reflective of the usual claim language for diagnostic methods. As such, these examples are of limited use…”
Robert Rymerson agreed on August 12, 2013:
…
(page 138)
“I hope this issue around diagnostic methods is resolved soon as the applications in question are becoming very old.”
Mr. Rymerson also pointed out the urgency of the situation later in the same email:
…
“My position on this is that the detection step is essential and the method is patentable. Isabelle and the organic section heads have reached the same conclusion as did Marc De Vleeshauwer and Maria. Chris and Katrina are on the other side of the fence!”
Mr. Gillen agreed that the Examples were problematic. He explained that only Mr. Evans and Ms. Campsall were of the opinion that a per se known detection step was non-essential. He noted that Mr. Evans had drafted new Examples for the discussion of “inherent anticipation”:
(page 144)
On August 15, 2013, Ms. Campsall forwarded the revised Examples to Ms. Lajoie, who forwarded them on to the Chief of the Electrical Division, Nathalie Tremblay.
(page 148)
The examples are lengthy and appear beginning on page 149. The titles provide useful orientation, but do not speak to the details:
“…we are back to “contribution” and the Federal Court told us to stop doing this!”
In mid-August 2013, a draft interim notice to diagnostic examiners was prepared by Ms. Campsall, with the apparent aim of getting non-contentious patent applications moving in the examination process. The earliest version of this document is apparently not provided, but Mr. Evans provided his comments to Ms. Campsall on August 16, 2013, and suggested using a set paragraphs, conceding that they “may still need much polishing”:
(page 159)
The focus on prior art and reference to contribution analysis are unfortunate here. It is also curious that, in the last paragraph, examination may proceed “If the claimed diagnostic method may be credibly addressed on the basis of prior art, sufficiency, utility, or statutory subject matter defects”. Does “credibly addressed” mean “rejected to for some other reason not related to subject matter eligibility”?
The document prepared by Ms. Campsall and Mr. Evans was edited by Mr. Gillen on August 22, 2013, although we do not appear to have his version:
(page 162)
“I had a quick read over Michael’s draft… I think the final draft will be closer to our document than his.”
A subsequent email from Ms. Campsall of August 28, 2013 to Mr. de Vleeshauwer stated “I think the final draft will be closer to our document than his”:
(page 166)
Ms. Robert expressed concern about the delay on the interim guidance in an email of August 29, 2013 11:58 AM:
(page 167)
The revised interim guidance appears on pages 180-182, an excerpt of which is reproduced below. At this stage, contribution analysis is mentioned and the assessment relies on an examiner’s search of prior art:
(page 180)
Patent applications were to be divided into three categories:
(page 181)
The idea was apparently that all but Category 3 could proceed in examination to clear out a portion of the backlog. However, the interim guidance capped examiner time for considering “complex examination” cases:
(page 181)
“…I think it is unfortunate any reference is made to contribution analysis – isn’t this completely irrelevant now?”
The mention of contribution in the interim guidelines was noted by Mr. Ohan in an email of September 17, 2016, and excerpt of which is presented:
…
…
(page 204)
“We purposively (!) stayed away from purposive construction because that is one of the main source of disagreement.”
On September 17, 2013, Mr. de Vleeschauwer indicated that the interim guidance had stayed away from the subject of purposive construction, and reported that the discussion of interim guidance had become protracted itself:
(page 209)
On September 18, 2013, Mr. Ohan questioned the value of the interim guidance, noting that few applications in the backlog would actually move forward in examination:
(page 219)
On September 19, Mr. de Vleeschauwer wrote to Mr. Evans and Ms. Campsall to say that direction from the Commissioner was required:
(page 231)
Mr. Evans replied, asking how Mr. Laporte could be advised without the “inherent anticipation” question being addressed:
(page 239)
Here, the notion of discretional “construction options” is troubling.
Mr. de Vleeschauwer then proposed to call the next meeting on the subject “inherent anticipation of diagnostic methods” in order to “make it a little more appealing” (page 239).
On October 4, 2013, when Ms. Campsall circulated a list of cases for a planned discussion of “reverse infringement, mere discovery or inevitable result, and of course diagnostic methods”:
Discussion at this point had moved from “inherent anticipation” (noted by Mr. Evans above) to something termed “reverse infringement”, under which a later diagnostic method involving measurement of an analyte was somehow deemed to infringe an earlier-claimed method involving measurement of the same analyte to diagnose a different disease. This apparently indicated to some that the later diagnostic may be a “mere discovery”.
Senior Patent Examiner, Xiao-ying Ma (a recipient of the above email from Ms. Campsall) explained this approach in an email of October 16, 2013, though it is clear from her other comments that she was not at all in agreement with it:
(page 249)
The example provided for this discussion was evidently the one drafted by Mr. Evans (see Mr. Gillen’s email of August 12, 2013), which appears below:
Mr. Gillen replied on October 16, 2013, expressing concern about this approach, and about the persistence of contribution analysis:
(page 252)
“…these are not good examples, and discussing them is pointless.”
The Examples were again criticized by Mr. Ohan and Mr. Rymerson. Mr. Ohan wrote on October 16, 2013:
…
(page 254)
“I have reviewed the attached examples and find them rather contrived and simplistic… I do not understand why the questions in the examples involve infringement…”
Mr. Rymerson agreed, and also questioned the foray into questions of infringement during examination:
(page 262)
On October 17, 2013, Xiao-Ying Ma forwarded an email from Examiner Sophie Beaudoin (pages 264), the latter pointing to a 1957 CIBA Ltd. vs. Canada decision of the Exchequer Court (27 CPR 82) in which the Court found that claims involving the reaction of known materials by known methods to make a new product were patentable. Ms. Ma replied the same day, referencing the Calgon Carbon v. North Bay decision of the Federal Court of Appeal (2005 FCA 410) with its finding (in deference to the Supreme Court in Shell Oil) that a new use of an old method is not a “mere discovery”:
(page 264)
“It sounds like they simply do not understand Shell Oil.”
This led to a discussion of the Shell Oil decision of the Supreme Court, and Mr. Ohan expressed the opinion that the decision was not understood:
…(page 266)
Mr. Ohan’s full comments on the subject (page 267) and Ms. Ma’s (page 268) are worth reading. To quote a poignant passage:
…
…
(page 267)
On October 18, 2013, Mr. Gillen discussed purposive construction, stating emphatically “This is the only legal basis going forward!”:
(page 272)
Readers wary of mention of “problem and solution” post-PN2015-02 must remember these comments were prior to CIPO’s problematic “building blocks” approach to diagnostics, under which examiners must choose between a “data acquisition problem” or a “data analysis problem” (the problem can never encompass both). Mr. Gillen clearly does not hold this view (indeed, for him it would appear that Section 2 is often “not an issue”), and hence his mention of a problem and its solution does not restrict essential elements in the way that PN2015-02 does.
“This of course is the contribution approach!!”
Mr. Gillen again expressed concern about contribution analysis in brief message sent two minutes later:
“…and hopefully we choose wisely”
Mr. Ohan agreed, but also expressed concern about “crippled” examination. He stated that a “consistent and clear approach” was required:
(page 277)
Ms. Ma expressed agreement with Mr. Gillen and Mr. Ohan, and stated that the two camps construed claims differently:
(page 277)
“Did the inventor do her own work or did she simply look at a database exploiting the work of others?”
Ms. Campsall set out her view of one example scenario in an email exchange with Ms. Ma in October, including emails of October 17 (page 289) and October 25, 2013 (page 286). The former is reproduced. Ms. Campsall’s expressed concern over the question “what do you get?” from a diagnostic, and about the potential for “exploitation” of the work of others:
Does this final question refer to a database of public information? If not public, it seems that the “others” could be co-inventors. If public, the suggestion that databases exploits the work of others is startling. Innovation does not occur in a vacuum, and the Patent Act expressly permits the patenting of improvements in Sections 2 and 32.
“…I feel we are starting to discuss whether or not a diagnostic method is a patentable subject matter. We all know it is…”
Ms. Ma replied on October 18, 2013:
…
(page 288)
Later in this message, Ms. Ma returned to a discussion of the Calgon Carbon v. North Bay decision (2005 FCA 410).
On November 18, 2013 Mr. Evans circulated news of the U.S. District Court Ariosa decision (page 314).
Discussion in December 2013 turned to a planned update of MOPOP Chapter 17. Josée Pharand indicated in an email of December 9, 2013 that diagnostics were being discussed with senior management:
(page 329)
And so ends the year 2013 according to ATI.
Excerpts from 2014 Documents:
“Chris has issues with what happens in the market place if two patents issue where the same marker is used to detect different diseases… but… purposive construction doesn’t involve a look at the post-grant marketplace… Also, purposive construction doesn’t involve looking at the prior art…”
From an Email from Micheal Gillen – January 6, 2014:
“When I read Josée’s email (below), it seemed like I was the “crazy uncle” with an “alternative approach”… Josée seems to have been led to believe that everyone is on board… except me.”
From an Email from Michael Gillen – January 7, 2014 9:13 AM:
“This has been my point in the meetings we had on diagnostic methods and is the position of the biotechnology division and those in the chemical division who work with diagnostic tools and methods. It is not, and never has been, exclusively my position or my approach – it is the position of the examination divisions that work with diagnostic method applications as represented by the section heads in these divisions.”
Excerpt of a draft email circulated by Micheal Gillen – February 9, 2014:
(page 206)
“There is absolutely no basis in law for this and no reason why CIPO should take this approach. It is unexplainable, unsustainable and contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shell [Oil]!”
Excerpts of an Email from Micheal Gillen – February 12, 2014:
…
…
“My worry is that the table will find its way to [Commissioner of Patents] without comments, or text… This is unacceptable to me.”
Email from Michael Gillen – February 14, 2014 9:58 AM:
“Sylvain is now aware and seemingly disappointed that we have not worked this out.”
Email Exchange of February 18 & 19, 2014:
(page 500)
“…it’s always Schlumberger…”
Email from Michael Gillen – February 19, 2014 1:18 PM:
(page 503)
“I have met with Katrina Capsall, Chris Evans, and Jeff Orser in order to get an idea of the scope of the diagnostics methods issue and to make sure that I properly understand the issue.”
Email from Josée Pharand – February 19, 2014 1:21 PM:
(page 499)
“In my opinion, asking Agnès and Sylvain to decide… is irresponsible. Unless we are prepared to make a recommendation, we are effectively transferring a very technical decision to non-expert (Sylvain) who will be briefed by a generalist (Agnès).”
Email from Chris Evans – February 19, 2014 4:14 PM:
(page 979)
“I am endorsing this approach because it is consistent with the Office’s PC approach. I think we will just have to agree to disagree at this point – I just really want to be able to write something in Chapter 17.”
Email from Katrina Campsall – March 3, 2014 8:55 AM:
“I also told him that for me the line between CGK and prior art is artificial (risk for inconsistancies (sic) in examination) to make a determination on [Section 2 of the Patent Act]…”
Email from the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Agnès Lajoie – April 3, 2014 12:49PM:
(page 761)
Email from Josée Pharand – April 16, 2014 4:42 PM:
(page 779)
“Some of the scenarios have been changed (again! – we’re still playing “whack-a-diagnostic”). [Common general knowledge] seems to be a “cancer” that knows no bounds!”
Email from Michael Gillen – April 17, 2017 11:46 AM:
(page 787)
“I don’t understand why the table was sent to me at the end of the day yesterday with a noon deadline for today… There is no need for short turn-around-times on any of this practice stuff… It’s important to get all of this right…
Who decided to send the table to [the Commissioner of Patents]?… What would be the point in sending [the Commissioner] a table… where we disagree not only on the outcome for scenario (category) 3, but also some of the assumptions in all the scenarios?”
Email from Michael Gillen April 17, 2014 11:36 AM:
(page 296)
Excerpts from 2015 Documents:
Email from Kathleen Murphy – January 22, 2015:
(page 841)
“Non seulement nous créons un backlog de vielles demandes mais nous avons des enjeux de crédibilité à l’externe.”
Email from the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Agnès Lajoie – January 26, 2015 1:07 PM:
(page 841)
“I understand that we intend to keep this low key from a public perspective…”
Excerpts from a draft CIPO Communication Plan of June 2, 2015 removing mention of CIPO consultations with stakeholders:
…
…
(page 466)
Email from Kathleen Murphy – June 2, 2015 10:34 AM:
(page 487)
“I am also uncomfortable with the two instances where we say the delay is due to, among other things, consultation with stakeholders.”
Email from J. Scott Vasudeve – June 2, 2015 10:51 AM:
(page 978)
“…I have a fundamental concern regarding the [purposive construction] process in these cases… if such an error is present in the [Practice Notice] then it might be prudent to account for it before publishing it… In general I don’t understand why [Section Heads] are being kept in the dark about this until the last moment… “
Email from Nicholas Ohan – June 17, 2015:
(page 270)
Excerpts from 2015 Advice to the Deputy Minister of Industry:
…
…
ipflyonthewall 